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ESSAY

The Contradiction Between Alien Tort Statute
Jurisprudence and the Continued Immunity of
U.S. Officials for Acts of Torture Committed
Abroad
JULES LOBEL†

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.1 raised the critical question
of the extraterritorial application of fundamental human rights norms
when aliens sue those responsible for their torture or other abuses
under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).2 For three decades, starting with
Filártiga v. Peña-Irala3 in 1980, U.S. courts have relied on the
jurisdiction afforded by that statute to hold individuals or
corporations liable for human rights abuses committed against aliens
abroad. Indeed, in 2004, the Supreme Court affirmed the cautious use
of the ATS to provide a remedy for aliens who were subjected to
torture abroad.4 While the Supreme Court in Kiobel significantly
narrowed the scope of ATS extraterritorial jurisdiction, as will be
discussed in the Postscript to this Essay, U.S. courts still will assert
jurisdiction against foreign state officials who commit torture or
summary execution against aliens or citizens abroad under the
†

The author is the Bessie McKee Walthour Chaired Professor of Law at the University of
Pittsburgh Law School, and President of the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR).
1. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). After hearing argument on questions of whether
corporations could be held sued under the ATS on February 28, 2012, the Supreme Court
ordered briefing and reargument on March 5, 2012 on the question: ―Whether and under
what circumstances the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, allows courts to recognize a
cause of action for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a
sovereign other than the United States.‖ Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct.
1738 (2012) (mem.).
3. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
4. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 731 (2004) (―The position we take today
has been assumed by some federal courts for 24 years, ever since the Second Circuit decided
Filártiga v. Peña-Irala . . . .‖).
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Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA),5 and potentially still have
ATS jurisdiction to adjudicate claims that U.S. corporations or some
foreign officials committed human rights abuses against aliens in
another country.
Yet, in sharp contrast to the ATS line of cases, U.S. courts have
refused to adjudicate claims by citizens or aliens that U.S. officials
have been responsible for their torture or other abuses committed
abroad. Often, these courts have held that the U.S. Constitution's
prohibition on torture does not apply extraterritorially.6 Even after the
Supreme Court‘s landmark decision in Boumediene v. Bush,7 holding
that aliens detained by the U.S. military at Guantánamo Bay had a
right to seek a writ of habeas corpus in federal courts,8 the D.C.
Circuit has still opined that other fundamental provisions of the
Constitution, such as the Due Process Clause or the Eighth
Amendment‘s prohibition against torture, still do not apply
extraterritorially.9 Moreover, the D.C. Circuit has held that even an
alien‘s right to challenge his allegedly unlawful prolonged detention
by seeking a writ of habeas corpus does not apply to aliens held
extraterritorially in Afghanistan.10 In addition, numerous courts have
relied on various jurisdictional and technical doctrines such as the
Westfall Act, the special factors exception to Bivens claims, and
qualified immunity to refuse to adjudicate aliens‘ claims that they
have been tortured or otherwise abused by U.S. officials in the
context of the ―war against terror.‖11 Furthermore, there has been
dispute within the courts as to whether the international laws of war
should be applied by the courts against Executive conduct in the
armed conflict against al-Qaeda and the Taliban.12

5. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006).
6. Rasul v. Myers, 512 F.3d 644, 663–65 (D.C. Cir. 2008), vacated and remanded, 555
U.S. 1083 (2008), aff’d on remand, 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Harbury v. Deutch, 233
F.3d 596, 602–04 (D.C. Cir. 2000), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Christopher v. Harbury,
536 U.S. 403 (2002).
7. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
8. Id. at 795.
9. Rasul, 563 F.3d at 529.
10. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
11. See, e.g., Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 769, 771, 774–75 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Arar v.
Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 279, 286 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 532 F.3d 157 (2d Cir.
2008), vacated and superseded on reh’g en banc, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009).
12. See, e.g., Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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This Essay will argue that human rights jus cogens norms, such
as the prohibition against torture, extrajudicial killing, war crimes,
and prolonged arbitrary detention, must be applied by U.S. courts to
hold U.S. officials accountable for abuses they commit. These norms
generally give rise to universal jurisdiction and are universally
recognized by international society.13 While not every provision of
the U.S. Constitution may be applicable to U.S. conduct abroad,
certainly those that reflect the fundamental, universal values of
international society ought to be binding on U.S. officials wherever
and whenever they act, and actionable in U.S. courts.
I.

FILÁRTIGA, KIOBEL, AND LAWSUITS AGAINST U.S. OFFICIALS FOR
TORTURE COMMITTED AGAINST ALIENS

In 1980, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
spawned a new era of human rights litigation in accepting the Center
for Constitutional Rights‘ argument that a two-hundred-year-old
statute, the ATS, could provide federal court jurisdiction and a cause
of action for suits against foreign government officials who commit
torture against aliens abroad.14 In allowing Filártiga to litigate his
claims in federal court, the Second Circuit held that ―for purposes of
civil liability, the torturer has become like the pirate and slave trader
before him hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.‖15 The
court believed that ―giving effect to a jurisdictional provision enacted
by our First Congress, is a small but important step in the fulfillment
of the ageless dream to free all people from brutal violence.‖16 By
providing that a foreign governmental official who tortured someone
in another country could be held accountable in U.S. courts, the court
was aiding the enforcement of human rights principles that all
governments, including our own, had agreed to abide by.
While a few judges, such as Robert Bork in Tel-Oren v. Libyan
Arab Republic,17 questioned Filártiga‘s holding, the courts of appeals
were virtually unanimous in following Filártiga and allowing aliens
to sue foreign government officials who committed torture or other

13. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 404 (1987) (―A state has jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment for certain
offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern . . . .‖).
14. Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d. 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980).
15. Id. at 890.
16. Id.
17. 726 F.2d 774, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring).
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violations of fundamental human rights norms abroad.18 Even former
Prime Ministers were not accorded immunity from suit, with the
Supreme Court rejecting the argument made by the former Prime
Minister of Somalia that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
accorded him immunity from an ATS claim for his official acts
committed on behalf of the Somalian government in Samantar v.
Yousuf.19 On remand, the Fourth Circuit rejected the former official‘s
claim that common law immunity protected him from liability for his
official government conduct. The Fourth Circuit held that because the
allegations of the complaint alleged violations of fundamental human
rights norms, known as jus cogens norms, including torture,
extrajudicial killing, and prolonged arbitrary imprisonment of
politically and ethnically disfavored groups, official immunity was
not available.20 In so holding, the Fourth Circuit recognized that both
international and U.S. courts have increasingly concluded that ―jus
cogens violations are not legitimate official acts and therefore do not
merit foreign official immunity.‖21 Moreover, in 1991, Congress
explicitly affirmed Filártiga by enacting the TVPA, which authorizes
a civil cause of action brought by either U.S. citizens or aliens against
any individual who ―under actual or apparent authority, or color of
law, of any foreign nation . . . subjects an individual to torture . . . or
extrajudicial killing.‖22
Nonetheless, U.S. government officials who have committed
torture or other jus cogens violations against aliens abroad have been
shielded from accountability in U.S. courts despite the Filártiga line
of cases. The second ATS case, Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan,23
brought by the Center for Constitutional Rights after Filártiga began
18. See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 845 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that a
claim involving government-sponsored ―torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment‖ could be brought under the ATS); Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir.
1995) (holding that acts of foreign officials involving ―genocide, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity‖ fall under the ATS).
19. 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2282 (2010).
20. Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 778 (4th Cir. 2012). The Fourth Circuit did
recognize that head of state immunity, as opposed to official immunity, was absolute, at least
with respect to current heads of state. Id. at 776. Other courts have also accorded immunity
to heads of state or even former heads of state. See, e.g., Tachiona v. United States, 386 F.3d
205, 221 (2d Cir. 2004); Ye v. Zemin, 383 F.3d 620, 630 (7th Cir. 2004).
21. Yousuf, 699 F.3d at 776.
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006); see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 731
(2004) (describing the TVPA as supplementing the Filártiga decision).
23. 770 F.2d. 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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the trend. In Sanchez-Espinoza, Nicaraguan citizens brought a suit
against current and former Reagan Administration officials as well as
Nicaraguan contra organizations and individuals under the ATS and
the Constitution alleging that these officials had aided the contras in
summarily executing and torturing civilians in Nicaragua. 24 The D.C.
Circuit, in an opinion written by then Judge Scalia, and joined in by
then Judge Ginsburg, held that the ATS claim had to be dismissed on
the basis of immunity because it ―would make a mockery of the
doctrine of sovereign immunity if federal courts were authorized to
sanction or enjoin, by judgments nominally against present or former
Executive officers, actions that are, concededly and as a
jurisdictional necessity, official actions of the United States.‖25
Thus, under this decision, U.S. officials cannot be sued under the
ATS for official acts they committed which violate fundamental jus
cogens human rights norms such as torture or summary execution,
despite the fact that foreign officials have no such immunity from suit
for the same acts.26 The following hypothetical provides a stark
example of the contradiction. Assume that a foreign government
official and a high U.S. official enter into a conspiracy to torture an
alien in a foreign country, and that in both countries the official
actions, although secret, are taken on behalf of the government as
official policy. The alien at some point gets released and his torture
ends. If the foreign government official was to come to the United
States, the alien could sue him under either the ATS or the TVPA in
U.S. courts. However, the U.S. official would be accorded immunity.
That result seems to make no sense—why should U.S. courts have
jurisdiction over official acts of a foreign government official, but not
over the same acts committed by a U.S. official? Unfortunately, as I
discuss below, this scenario is not hypothetical, but illustrates the
claims of a real plaintiff who alleged this was exactly what happened
to him.
II. ACCOUNTABILITY FOR TORTURE IN U.S. COURTS IN THE FIGHT
AGAINST TERRORISM
Since 2001, various alien plaintiffs have brought lawsuits
seeking damages in U.S. courts alleging that U.S. officials subjected
24. Id. at 205.
25. Id. at 207.
26. Professor David Cole wrote about this contradiction in a prescient law review article
right after the Sanchez-Espinoza case was decided. See David Cole, Challenging Covert
War: The Politics of the Political Question Doctrine, 26 HARV. INT‘L L. J. 155 (1985).
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them to torture abroad. None have succeeded. While the courts have
utilized a variety of doctrines to dismiss these claims, the one stark
and consistent holding has been that U.S. officials will not be held
accountable in U.S. courts for claims of torture. These rulings
contrast sharply with Filártiga.
A.

The Arar Case and Extraordinary Rendition

Perhaps the case that raises the most vivid example of the federal
courts‘ refusal to address claims that U.S. officials sanctioned torture
is Arar v. Ashcroft.27 Arar, a Canadian citizen of Syrian descent, was
transferring planes at Kennedy Airport in New York when he was
detained by INS agents based on a tip from the Canadian police that
he was a member of al-Qaeda.28 Questioned repeatedly by the FBI,
Arar denied the allegations.29 After two weeks of solitary
confinement in Brooklyn, INS officials, with the approval of then
U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft, secretly rendered Arar to Syria,
where he was tortured and locked in a damp, cold, underground cell
that Arar termed a ―grave‖ cell measuring three feet wide, six feet
long and seven feet high.30 After a year in detention, Syria released
him, concluding that Arar had no connection to terrorism, and he
returned home to Canada.31 To this day, Arar suffers severely from
his ordeal.
In 2004, Canada convened a commission to conduct an official
inquiry into the Arar affair.32 In September 2006, the commission
issued a voluminous report fully exonerating Arar of any connection
to al-Qaeda or any terrorist group.33 The Canadian government
accepted the commission‘s recommendation and officially apologized
to Arar and paid him $11.5 million Canadian dollars as compensation
for the Canada‘s role in his ordeal.34

27. 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009).
28. Id. at 563.
29. Id. at 565.
30. See id. at 565–66.
31. See id. at 566–67.
32. 1 COMM‘N OF INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS OF CAN. OFFICIALS IN RELATION TO MAHER
ARAR, REPORT OF THE EVENTS RELATING TO MAHER ARAR: FACTUAL BACKGROUND (2006),
available at http://www.sirc-csars.gc.ca/pdfs/cm_arar_bgv1-eng.pdf.
33. See id. at 59.
34. Ian Auster, Canada Will Pay $9.75 Million to Man Sent to Syria and Tortured, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 27, 2007, at A5.
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In January 2004, Arar filed a complaint against various U.S.
officials, including former U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft,
seeking damages and alleging that they had sent him to Syria for the
purpose of subjecting him to torture and detention there, and had
indeed conspired with Syrian officials to do so.35 For why, asked
Arar and his lawyers,36 would the United States send a man whom it
suspected of being an al-Qaeda terrorist to Syria, which the United
States claimed at the time was a state sponsor of terrorism that
practices torture, and not to Canada, the United States‘ friend and
ally? The only plausible explanation, Arar and his lawyers posited,
was that U.S. officials believed that Syria would detain and use
coercive interrogation methods on Arar to obtain information that the
FBI had not been able to get, and which they thought Canada could
not obtain through ordinary police methods. As it turned out, Arar
had no information to provide.
Arar argued that since U.S. officials were constitutionally
forbidden from torturing him in New York, they could not
intentionally subject him to torture by outsourcing it, namely by
shipping him to Syria to be tortured there.37 Despite Arar‘s strong
claims on the merits, the district court, a divided Second Circuit
panel, and a divided en banc Second Circuit decision dismissed
Arar‘s claims.38 Each decision found, under somewhat different
reasoning, that Arar had no Bivens‘ claim for damages.39 Perhaps
most importantly for this discussion, the en banc majority held that
because the high level government officials were acting based on
official U.S. policy and were not simply some rogue agents, no claim
for damages should be allowed since the action really was against the
U.S. government and not the individual officers.40
Arar also asserted a claim under the TVPA, which the courts
also dismissed.41 The TVPA does not provide for a cause of action
for torture committed by a U.S. official acting solely under U.S. law;
Arar claimed that U.S. officials conspired with Syrian officials to

35. Complaint at 2–4, Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (No. CV04-0249 DGT VVP).
36. I was one of Arar‘s lawyers.
37. Complaint, supra note 35, at 10.
38. Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 287–88 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 532 F.3d 157
(2d Cir. 2008), vacated and superseded on reh’g en banc, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009).
39. Id.
40. Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 574–76 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc).
41. Id. at 563.
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have him tortured in Syria.42 There was no doubt that, had federal
courts been able to assert personal jurisdiction over one of the Syrian
officials involved in Arar‘s torture, the TVPA would have provided a
private cause of action, because Arar would have been suing a Syrian
official who had acted under color of Syrian law. The Second Circuit
held, however, that Arar‘s suit against U.S. officials for a joint
conspiracy with the Syrians did not state a claim under the TVPA,
because the statute only provided a cause of action for torture
committed under color of foreign law, and the U.S. officials were
acting pursuant to U.S. law, not Syrian law.43 The court discounted a
prior Second Circuit opinion44 as well as the decisions of various
courts of appeals in which federal officials acting in concert with
state officials in a joint conspiracy were held to have acted under
color of state law, even though they were acting in their capacity as
federal officials.45 The upshot of the Second Circuit‘s TVPA analysis
is that a Syrian official who could be found in the United States could
have been sued for damages, yet a claim could not be asserted against
the U.S. officials who allegedly conspired with the Syrians. However,
it makes no sense to allow U.S. courts to assert jurisdiction against
foreign officials acting in their official capacity on behalf of a foreign
sovereign—a scenario fraught with potential foreign policy and
interference with sovereignty concerns—but not officials of the U.S.
government who are part of a coordinate branch of government
whose actions are ordinarily subject to review by the federal courts.
B.

Federal Courts’ Dismissal of ATS Torture Claims Against U.S.
Officials

The Second Circuit‘s dismissal of Arar‘s claims is not
exceptional, but the norm. Every other circuit has also dismissed
actions by citizens and aliens alike for torture claims arising out of
U.S. officials‘ conduct abroad in the ―war on terror.‖46 For example,
aliens‘ torture claims brought against U.S. officials pursuant to the
42. Id. at 566.
43. Id. at 568.
44. Kletschka v. Driver, 411 F.2d 436, 448 (2d Cir. 1969).
45. See Hindes v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 137 F.3d 148, 159 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing
Third, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuit cases to support the assertion that ―federal
officials are subject to section 1983 liability . . . where they have acted under color of state
law, for example in conspiracy with state officials‖).
46. See, e.g., Padilla v. Yoo, 678 F.3d 748, 769 (9th Cir. 2012); Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701
F.3d 193, 205 (7th Cir. 2012); Rasul v. Rumsfeld, 414 F. Supp. 2d 26, 38 (D.D.C. 2006).
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ATS have been dismissed as precluded by the Westfall Act, which
provides that, where the defendant ―was acting within the scope of
his office or employment at the time of the incident out of which the
claim arose,‖ the United States will be substituted as the defendant.47
By this provision, the Westfall Act makes the Federal Tort Claims
Act,48 with its broad provisions of immunity for acts committed
abroad, the exclusive remedy for any tort committed by a federal
official acting within the scope of his employment. Whenever an
alien sues a federal official under the ATS for torture, the official
invariably has claimed that his actions were committed within the
scope of his employment, the U.S. has been substituted as a
defendant, and the claim has been dismissed.49
Federal courts have rejected the application to U.S. officials of
the identical argument that plaintiffs successfully made in the ATS
lawsuits against foreign officials: that official torture is a violation of
fundamental human rights norms and of criminal law and therefore
cannot be undertaken by the official within the scope of his official
governmental duties. As the D.C. Circuit opined: ―While it may
generally be unexpected that seriously criminal conduct will arise ‗in
the prosecution of the business,‘ here it was foreseeable that conduct
that would ordinarily be indisputably ‗seriously criminal‘ [torture]
would be implemented by military officials responsible for detaining
and interrogating suspected enemy combatants.‖50 Therefore, such
torture was within the scope of the military officials‘ employment.51
Other courts have similarly dismissed ATS claims, rejecting
arguments that torture in violation of a jus cogens norm cannot be
considered within the scope of a U.S. official‘s employment.52

47. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1) (2006). For a discussion of the impact of the Westfall Act on
civil human rights litigation, see Elizabeth A. Wilson, Is Torture All in a Day’s Work? Scope
of Employment, the Absolute Immunity Doctrine, and Human Rights Litigation Against U.S.
Federal Officials, 6 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 175 (2008).
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2006).
49. See, e.g., Rasul v. Myers, 512 F.3d 644, 660 (D.C. Cir. 2008), vacated and
remanded, 555 U.S. 1083 (2008), aff’d on remand, 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 774–75 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (dismissing ATCA
torture claims brought by Iraqi victims of torture at Abu Ghraib because such torture was
committed within the scope of the officials‘ employment).
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C. Limiting the Extraterritorial Reach of the Constitution’s
Proscription of Torture
Similarly, the D.C. Circuit has dismissed constitutional claims of
torture brought by aliens arising out of their detention by military
officials. Prior to Boumediene v. Bush,53 in which the Supreme Court
held that the Constitution‘s Suspension Clause applied to detainees
held at Guantánamo Bay,54 the D.C. Circuit and district courts in that
circuit had consistently held that the constitutional proscription of
cruel and inhumane punishment did not reach U.S. officials who
tortured aliens abroad.55 In Rasul v. Myers,56 first decided by the D.C.
Circuit just prior to the Supreme Court‘s holding in Boumediene, the
court reiterated that rule in dismissing a Bivens damage action
brought by former detainees at Guantánamo against high government
officials for alleged torture they suffered during their detention.57
The Supreme Court vacated the Rasul dismissal after the
Boumediene decision, ordering the D.C. Circuit to review its decision
in light of Boumediene.58 However, in Kiyemba v. Obama,59 the D.C.
Circuit held that the Court‘s Boumediene decision only involved the
applicability of the Suspension Clause to Guantánamo and did not
affect prior circuit law that the Due Process Clause did not apply to
aliens without property or presence within the United States.60 When
the D.C. Circuit revisited Rasul, it noted that ―the Court in
Boumediene disclaimed any intention to disturb existing law
governing the extraterritorial reach of any constitutional provisions,
other than the Suspension Clause.‖61 While the court is technically
correct that Boumediene explicitly addressed only the Suspension
Clause, Boumediene‘s extended discussion of the Constitution‘s
extraterritorial reach clearly undermined the D.C. Circuit‘s prior
holdings that the Constitution simply did not apply to aliens tortured
53. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
54. Id. at 771.
55. Harbury v. Deutch, 233 F.3d 596, 602–03 (D.C. Cir. 2000); In re Iraq and
Afghanistan Detainee Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D.D.C. 2007).
56. 512 F.3d 644 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
57. Id. at 663–65.
58. Rasul v. Myers, 555 U.S. 1083, 1083 (2008), aff’d on remand, 563 F.3d 527 (D.C.
Cir. 2009).
59. 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2009), vacated per curiam, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010).
60. Id. at 1026–27.
61. Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
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abroad. The Court‘s review of its prior extraterritorial jurisprudence
in Boumediene made clear that ―these decisions undermine the
Government‘s argument that, at least as applied to noncitizens, the
Constitution necessarily stops where de jure sovereignty ends.‖62
The D.C. Circuit, however, chose not to rest its decision on the
ground that the Constitution does not apply to torture of aliens
abroad, holding instead that the defendants were entitled to qualified
immunity because reasonable officials would not have known that the
prohibition against torture applies to Guantánamo until at least after
Boumediene was decided in 2008.63 Indeed, the court‘s dicta suggests
that, even now, it is not clearly established that the constitutional
proscription against torture applies to Guantánamo or any other U.S.
military base abroad, and that U.S. officials who engaged in torture
abroad now would still be entitled to qualified immunity.64
More recently, in Ali v. Rumsfeld,65 the D.C. Circuit revisited the
issue of whether the Constitution protects aliens abroad from torture
by U.S. officials, this time in the context of claims brought by Iraqi
citizens allegedly tortured at the Abu Ghraib prison by U.S.
officials.66 As in Rasul v. Myers, the court based its decision
dismissing plaintiffs‘ claims on qualified immunity grounds. 67 The
D.C. Circuit reiterated the Rasul statement that the Boumediene
decision was limited to the Suspension Clause and did not apply to
any other constitutional provision.68 However, the court went further
and noted in dictum that even were the Boumediene functional test to
apply to a claim of torture, the alleged torture took place in Iraq—at
the time an ―active theater of war‖—and therefore the Fifth and
Eighth Amendments would undoubtedly not apply under
Boumediene.69
In summary, while foreign government officials can be sued in
the U.S. for officially sanctioned extraterritorial torture (at least until
now), U.S. government officials generally cannot. A host of doctrines
62. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 755 (2008).
63. Rasul, 563 F.3d at 529.
64. Id. (stating that the D.C. Circuit‘s prior law that the Constitution does not apply to
U.S. actions against aliens abroad remains undisturbed by the Supreme Court‘s opinion in
Boumediene, with the exception of the Suspension Clause, which does not apply in some
circumstances).
65. 649 F.3d 762 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
66. Id. at 764–65.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 772.
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preclude any civil accountability for a U.S. official that orders or
engages in torture abroad. The Westfall Act generally precludes ATS
liability taken within the scope of official employment; 70 the TVPA
has been held not to apply to U.S. officials who are acting under
color of U.S., not foreign law;71 the D.C. Circuit has held that
constitutional proscriptions do not apply to U.S. official torture of
aliens abroad and in any event officials who engage in such torture
are shielded by the doctrine of qualified immunity; 72 and as the
Second Circuit decided in Arar, courts have generally held that no
private cause of action can be implied under Bivens to give aliens or
even citizens a claim against U.S. officials for torture committed
abroad.73
III. JUS COGENS, FUNDAMENTAL NORMS, AND CIVIL LIABILITY FOR
U.S. TORTURE ABROAD
The basic proposition that stems from the ATS cases until now is
that foreign officials who commit abuses abroad which violate jus
cogens human rights norms can be sued in U.S. courts and are not
entitled to immunity, even if they are acting on behalf of their
government. The jus cogens analysis applied in these ATS cases
should be applicable to cases against U.S. officials. Courts should
utilize the concept of jus cogens human rights violations in analyzing
lawsuits against U.S. officials for officially sponsored torture
committed against aliens abroad. The use of jus cogens principles in
litigation against federal officials, and not simply foreign officials,
would have several important consequences. First, it would remove
the inconsistency that has developed in federal courts between the
treatment of foreign officials and federal officials who torture aliens.
Second, jus cogens principles should be an important substantive aid
in determining which constitutional norms should be applicable to
U.S. officials acting extraterritorially.
The Supreme Court and other courts have struggled with the
question of when constitutional norms apply to U.S. government

70. See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text.
71. E.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 568 (2d Cir. 2009).
72. Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Ali, 649 F.3d at 764–65.
73. Arar, 585 F.3d at 568.
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actions against aliens abroad.74 In the Supreme Court‘s latest opinion
on the issue, Boumediene, the Court articulated a functional test,
which took a middle position between the view that the Constitution
simply does not apply to governmental action against aliens abroad,
and the more cosmopolitan perspective that all of the provisions of
the Constitution apply wherever and whenever the government acts.75
Based on that test, the Court found that detainees held at Guantánamo
Bay could seek a writ of habeas corpus to challenge their
detentions.76 Nonetheless, the D.C. Circuit, as already mentioned, has
held that the Supreme Court‘s Boumediene decision did not disturb
prior circuit law which had held that the Constitutional proscriptions
against torture did not apply to U.S. actions against aliens abroad.77
Importing the ATS jus cogens analysis into the constitutional
extraterritorial framework would provide clarity, consistency, and
principled decision-making. An approach to the extraterritorial
application of the Constitution abroad that asked whether the
constitutional principle at issue reflects a fundamental, non-derogable
norm of international law preserves governmental flexibility in
dealing with different cultures, societies, and legal systems, as well as
the myriad problems that afflict foreign policy, yet also recognizes
that there are certain types of conduct that are so contrary to the
fundamental norms of civilized society that the Constitution must
prohibit the government from engaging in them whenever, wherever,
and against whomever it acts. The cases the Boumediene Court relied
on—United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,78 Johnson v. Eisentrager,79
the Insular Cases, and the opinions by Justice Harlan and Justice
Frankfurter in Reid v. Covert80—are all premised on the proposition
that when the government acts abroad, there may be circumstances
when it acts in the context of a different legal regime that permits a
practice that the Constitution would prohibit were the actions to occur
here. In Verdugo, Mexican law did not require a search warrant;81 in
Eisentrager, military law and the international law of war permitted

74. See Jules Lobel, Fundamental Norms, International Law and the Extraterritorial
Constitution, 36 YALE J. INT‘L L. 307, 324–34 (2011).
75. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 764–67 (2008). For a discussion of Justice
Kennedy‘s functional compromise, see Lobel, supra note 74, at 316–18.
76. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 795.
77. Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
78. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
79. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
80. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
81. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S at 262–63.
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trial of war crimes committed by enemy combatants by military
tribunal;82 in the Insular Cases, the law of newly acquired territories
did not provide for jury trials; in Reid, an agreement between Great
Britain and the United States permitted trial by U.S. court-martial of
defendants who committed crimes in Great Britain while
accompanying members of the armed forces overseas.83
Unlike the rights at issue in those cases, there are some rights,
such as the right to be free of torture, genocide, or slavery, that are
treated as fundamental and never derogable by the international
community as a whole. While nations obviously do engage in torture,
genocide, and slavery, no country asserts the legal authority to do so,
and laws of other nations prohibit such practices. The cultural and
legal diversity rationale partially underlying the Boumediene
functional test is thus inapplicable to such non-derogable universal
norms.
Moreover, the international community, including the U.S.
government, has not merely accepted these rights as fundamental, but
has agreed that it is never ―practicable‖ to engage in such conduct as,
for example, torture, summary execution, or genocide, irrespective of
whatever ―realistic‖ or ―practical‖ foreign policy arguments are made
to support such actions. To use fundamental international law norms
to inform the Constitution‘s reach would thus both provide a limiting
normative principle and also meet the practical concerns that the
Court focused on in Boumediene.
Finally, jus cogens norms should inform the application of such
doctrines as qualified immunity and Westfall Act substitution of the
United States as a defendant for purposes of the ATS. That a norm is
considered so fundamental to the international community that all
nations, including the United States, consider it to be non-derogable
even in wartime or national emergencies suggests that any official
ought to know that it is impermissible to engage in such activity,
even if the government authorizes it. Officials who commit war
crimes, genocide, slavery, or torture should not be accorded qualified
immunity, even where higher officials authorized their actions. So
too, the D.C. Circuit is simply wrong that such criminal actions can
be considered to be within the scope of official employment. These
82. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 786.
83. Reid, 354 U.S. at 15.
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fundamental human rights principles should inform domestic
immunity doctrines, just as they have been utilized by the courts in
the ATS context.
IV. POSTSCRIPT: THE KIOBEL DECISION
This Essay was written prior to the Supreme Court‘s decision in
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.84 That decision held that ―the
presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims under the
ATS.‖85 One could thus view the Kiobel decision as lessening the
tension and contradiction set forth in this Essay by removing U.S
jurisdiction to adjudicate claims against foreign government officials
who commit serious human rights abuses against aliens
extraterritorially, just as the federal courts have accorded immunity to
U.S. officials who commit such abuses.
Yet the Kiobel decision does not resolve the tension set forth
here for several reasons. First, as Justice Kennedy noted in his
concurrence, the TVPA explicitly provides a cause of action for
aliens and citizens to sue foreign governmental officials who commit
certain serious human rights abuses abroad.86 Nonetheless, the courts
have held that the TVPA does not allow aliens or citizens to sue U.S.
officials who commit those same abuses abroad—even when they are
acting in concert with foreign governmental officials who could be
held liable. Thus, the contradiction that a federal action can be
maintained against foreign state torturers, but not U.S. official
torturers, for their conduct abroad, survives Kiobel.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, while the Kiobel
majority significantly narrowed the use of ATS jurisdiction to sue
human rights abusers for extraterritorial violations, it did not close
the courthouse door completely. As Justice Kennedy‘s critical and
vague concurrence recognizes, the majority opinion left open ―a
number of significant questions regarding the reach and interpretation
of the Alien Tort Statute.‖87 Most importantly, the majority implicitly
recognized that at least some abuses committed against aliens abroad
would be actionable in U.S. courts when it stated that ―even where
the claims touch and concern the territory of the United States, they
must do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption against
84. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
85. Id. at 1669.
86. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
87. Id.
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extraterritorial application.‖88 This strongly suggests that there might
be some claims which arise from conduct abroad, and therefore
would normally be subject to the presumption against
extraterritoriality, but which nonetheless ―touch and concern‖ U.S.
territory with sufficient strength to displace the presumption. The
Court is silent on what those types of claims might be. Similarly,
while the majority opinion holds that ―mere corporate presence‖ in
the United States does not suffice for the extraterritorial application
of ATS jurisdiction,89 it does not address whether an U.S. corporation
can be held accountable pursuant to ATS jurisdiction for acts
occurring abroad which are planned in the United States.
Yet if U.S. corporations can be sued for at least some human
rights violations occurring abroad—and that question is not yet
answered—then why should U.S. officials who commit the same
violations be accorded immunity? Absolute immunity from ATS
jurisdiction for U.S. officials is still inconsistent with the Court‘s
allowing at least some ATS cases to go forward.
Moreover, Justice Kennedy‘s brief concurrence, when combined
with Justice Breyer‘s concurrence on behalf of four justices who
disagreed with the majority‘s reasoning, suggests that in some cases
foreign officials could be held liable under ATS jurisdiction for acts
occurring abroad. Kennedy obscurely noted that cases ―may arise
with allegations of serious violations of international law principles
protecting persons‖ which are not covered by either the TVPA or the
―reasoning and holding of today‘s case,‖ in which the ―proper
implementation of the presumption against extraterritorial application
may require some further elaboration and explanation.‖90 As one
commentator has noted, Justice Kennedy‘s concerns at oral argument
with preserving Filártiga and cases like it may be behind this vague
concurrence.91
In addition, Justice Breyer‘s concurrence on behalf of himself
and three other Justices would uphold ATS jurisdiction where, inter
alia, the alleged torturer or human rights abuser has relocated to the
United States and seeks a ―safe harbor‖ from civil and criminal
88. Id. (majority opinion).
89. Id.
90. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
91. Anton Metlitsky, Commentary: What’s left of the Alien Tort Statute?, SCOTUSBLOG
(Apr. 18, 2013, 10:06 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=162581.
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liability here.92 Breyer explicitly refers to Filártiga and the Marcos
litigation as instances in which the courts of appeals properly found
jurisdiction where an alleged human rights abuser had fled to or
relocated in the territory of the United States.93 It is plausible that
faced with a case involving a foreign government official accused of
a serious human rights abuse (that is not torture or summary
execution and thus not covered by the TVPA), who has fled his home
country and is living in the United States, at least Justice Kennedy
and the four Breyer concurrers would hold that ATS jurisdiction lies.
Leaving this possibility open, as Justice Kennedy and the
majority seem to do, raises anew the tension at the core of this Essay.
Why should foreign governmental officials who commit human
rights abuses abroad and have fled their home countries and are
living in the United States be subject to federal court jurisdiction to
hold them civilly accountable for their violations, while U.S.
officials, who engage in the identical abuse be accorded a safe haven
here? Federal courts ought to have a stronger claim to assert
jurisdiction against the latter than the former. Kiobel, then, far from
resolving the contradiction presented here, seems to continue it, albeit
in a much more muted form.

92. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1674 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
93. Id. at 1675.

